CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL-THE RIGHT
TO JURY TRIAL

Is

NOT CONFERRED BY THE NEW JERSEY CON-

STITUTION TO CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE NEW JERSEY LAW

AGAINST DISCRIMINATIoN-Shaner

v. Horizon Bancorp, 116 N.J.

433, 561 A.2d 1130 (1989).
Throughout the development of civil procedure in the
United States, the right to trial by jury has spurred inconsistent
public opinion ranging from great praise' to scorn 2 . Discussion
about the right has been more passionate among modern legal
scholars. 3 While the debate between legal theorists and practitioners endures as to the relative merits of trial by jury,4 judicial
opinions continue to address the issue as new statutory causes of

action are litigated in New Jersey courts.5
I See 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282-83 (P. Bradley ed.
1984).
In his seminal critique of America, De Tocqueville voiced a tremendous admiration for the right to a jury trial. He viewed the right as one of the great attributes
of the sovereign power of the people. More specifically, De Toqueville asserted:
He who punishes the criminal is therefore the real master of society.
Now, the institution of the jury raises the people itself, or at least a
class of citizens, to the bench ofjudicial authority. The institution of
the jury consequently invest the people or that class of citizens, with
the direction of society.
Id.
2 See M. TWAIN, ROUGHIN' IT 247 (1872). Mark Twain ridiculed the institution
of the jury trial: "Thejury system puts a ban upon intelligence and honesty, and a
premium upon ignorance, stupidity, and perjury. It is a shame that we must continue to use a worthless system because it was good a thousand years ago." Id.
(emphasis in original).
3 See generally L. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 15782 (1973) (brief discussion of arguments for and against the right to jury trial); J.
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 132 (1949) ("[T]he jury is the worst possible enemy of
that ideal of the 'supremacy of law'. Forjury made law is par excellence, capricious
and arbitrary, yielding to maximum in way of lack of uniformity, and
unknowability.").
4 See generally Rashkow, Abolition of the CivilJury: ProposedAlternatives, 15 DE PAUL
L. REV. 417 (1965) (judicial reformists contend that courts presumably have experienced frustration with juries that simply delay proceedings through an expensive
means resulting in an inefficient end); Terry, Eliminating the Plaintiff's Attorneys in
Equal Employment Litigation: A Shakespearean Tragedy, 5 Lab. Law. 63 (1989) (plaintiffs' attorneys contend that reform has led to the detriment of protections for present victims of civil rights violations and disincentive for future victims to ensure
their civil rights).
5 See Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp, 116 N.J. 433, 448, 561 A.2d 1130, 1137-38
(1989). For recent cases challenging New Jersey statutes for the right to jury trial,
see McMillian v. Lincoln Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 678 F. Supp. 89 (D.N.J 1988)
(right to jury trial under LAD in federal court); New Jersey Sports & Exposition
Auth. v. Del Tufo, 210 N.J. Super. 664, 509 A.2d 329 (Law Div. 1986), aff'd, 230
N.J. Super. 616, 554 A.2d 878 (App. Div. 1989) (no right to jury trial to appraise
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The New Jersey Constitution provides that "[t]he right of
trial by jury shall remain inviolate." 6 As the state constitution
developed from 1776 to its present form, only nominal changes
were made to the trial by jury provision.7 Accordingly, the right
to trial by jury is preserved today for any cause of action that
enjoyed the right as of the adoption of the New Jersey Constitution in 1776.8 Absent express provision by the legislature, New
Jersey courts have been reluctant to extend the protection to
newly created statutory causes of action. 9
fair value of shares in stockholders' action); Manetti v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 196 N.J. Super. 317, 482 A.2d 520 (App. Div. 1984) (no right to jury
trial for statutorily created "PIP" benefits); State v. Tenriero, 183 N.J. Super. 519,
444 A.2d 623 (Law Div. 1981) (no right to jury trial for gambling offenses under
statute granting jurisdiction to superior court); Van Dissel v. Jersey Cent. Power &
Light Co., 181 N.J. Super. 516, 438 A.2d 563 (App. Div. 1981), certif denied, 89 N.J.
409, 446 A.2d 142 (1982), vacated on other grounds, 465 U.S. 1001, on remand, 194
N.J. Super. 108, 476 A.2d 310 (App. Div.), certif denied, 99 N.J. 186, 491 A.2d 689
(1984) (no right to jury trial for inverse condemnation action); Peterson v. Albano,
158 N.J. Super. 503, 386 A.2d 873 (App. Div. 1978), certif denied, 78 N.J. 337, 395
A.2d 206 (1978) (no right to jury trial in summary dispossess action); Quinchia v.
Waddington, 166 N.J. Super. 247, 399 A.2d 679 (Law Div. 1979) (no right to jury
trial to recover from Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund); Kugler v. Banner Pontiac-Buick, Opel, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 572, 295 A.2d 385 (Ch. Div. 1972) (no right
to jury trial for prosecution under Consumer Fraud Act).
6 N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 9. The provision states in full:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but the Legislature
may authorize the trial of civil causes by a jury of six persons when the
matter in dispute does not exceed fifty dollars. The Legislature may
provide that in any civil cause, a verdict may be rendered by not less
than five-sixths of the jury. The Legislature may authorize the trial of
the issue of mental incompetency without a jury.
Id.
7 SeeJ. Boyd, FUNDAMENTAL LAWS AND CONsrrrubONS OF NEW JERSEY (1973).
The New Jersey Constitution has been amended twice since 1776. The amendments occurred in 1844 and 1947. The 1776 New Jersey Constitution article I,
paragraph 22, states in pertinent part: "the inestimable Right of Trial by Jury shall
remain confirmed, as a Part of the Law of this Colony without Repeal for ever." Id.
at 162. The 1844 New Jersey Constitution article I,paragraph 7, states in full:
"The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate: but the Legislature may authorize
the trial of civil suits, when the matter in dispute does not exceed fifty dollars, by a
jury of six men." Id. at 195.
8 See Montclair v. Stanoyevich, 6 N.J. 479, 485, 79 A.2d 288, 291 (195 1);James,
The Right to aJury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963). See also infra notes
71-81 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., State v. Tenriero, 183 N.J. Super. 519, 444 A.2d 519 (Law Div. 1981).
The Legislature has consistently conferred the right to jury trial through express
provision. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-56 (West 1979) (labor dispute injunctions); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62-18 (West 1979) (quiet-title actions); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:62-21 (West 1979) (questions as to the validity of contractual clauses in deeds
of real estate); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62-24 (West 1979) (determining title to riparian lands and lands under water ); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:12-24 (West 1979) (civil
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New Jersey's Constitution reflects a strong public policy
against discrimination.' 0 The prevention of discrimination is
also an inherent exercise of the state's police power." New
Jersey supplemented the goals set forth in its constitution and
led the way in society's war against discrimination with the enactment of the Law Against Discrimination (LAD) in 1945.12
Although the LAD offers an array of equitable remedies to prevent future discriminatory behavior, it never expressly provided
for a right to jury trial in its initial statutory form, or in its subsequent amendments. 13 Recently, in Shanerv. Horizon Bancorp,'4 the
proceedings to determine mental competency); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:189-3 (West
1979) (abatement of nuisances); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14B-42 (West 1979) (regarding confidentiality of patient information by psychologists).
10 See N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 5, which provides: "No person shall be denied the
enjoyment of any civil or military right, nor be discriminated against in the exercise
of any civil or military right, nor be segregated in the militia or in the public
schools, because of religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national origin."
Id.
"I See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West Supp. 1989). The statute provides in pertinent part:
The Legislature finds and declares that practices of discrimination against any of its inhabitants, because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status, liability for service in
the Armed Forces of the United States, or nationality, are a matter of
concern to the government of the State, and that such discrimination
threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of the inhabitants
of the State but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free
democratic State; provided, however, that nothing in this expression
of policy prevents the making of legitimate distinctions between citizens and aliens when required by Federal law or otherwise necessary
to promote the national interest.
The Legislature further declares its opposition to such practices
of discrimination when directed against any person by reason of race,
creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status, liability
for service in the Armed Forces of the United States, or nationality of
that person or that person's spouse, partners, members, stockholders,
directors, officers, managers, superintendents, agents, employees,
business associates, suppliers, or customers, in order that the economic prosperity and general welfare of the inhabitants of the State
may be protected and ensured.
Id.
12 See 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 20 (1949). See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 40-c (McKinney 1989) (originally enacted in 1941); CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West 1989) (originally enacted in 1909).
13 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-13 (West Supp. 1989). The 1979 amendment to
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-13, which outlines the specific remedies available to a complainant, allows for prosecution of a civil suit in Superior Court. Id. Originally
§ 10:5-13 only provided for an administrative proceeding to be filed with the Division on Civil Rights. The amendment provides in pertinent part:
Any complainant may initiate suit in Superior Court under this
act without first filing a complaint with the division or any municipal
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New Jersey Supreme Court clarified its interpretation of the LAD
and the constitutional provision that warrants protection of the
right to jury trial.' 5 Recognizing that discrimination actions were
not analogous to any common law action providing for a right to
trial by jury,' 6 the Shaner court held that jury trials are not available for claims arising under the LAD, because 7the statute
neither expressly nor impliedly conferred the right.'
After working approximately eight years as a banking executive for the defendant, Horizon Bancorp (Horizon),' 8 Mahlon R.
Shaner was discharged at the age of fifty-three.19 Shaner alleged
that Horizon dismissed him from employment because of his age,
and filed claims against Horizon asserting wrongful discharge on
statutory grounds under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) and the New Jersey LAD.2 0 Shaner also asserted a claim based on a violation of a clear mandate
of state public policy 2 ' and sued for compensatory damages, inoffice. Prosecution of such suit in Superior Court under this act shall
bar the filing of a complaint with the division or any municipal office
during the pendency of any such suit.
Id.
14 116 NJ. 433, 561 A.2d 1130 (1989).
15 Id.
16

Id. at 455, 561 A.2d at 1141.

17 Id at 446, 561 A.2d at 1137.
18 Id. at 434, 561 A.2d at 1130. The plaintiff, occupied the title of Chief Financial
Officer of Bancshares of NewJersey, a holding company for the bank of NewJersey
(corporate predecessor of Horizon Bancorp). Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Shaner v.
Horizon Bancorp, 116 N.J. 433, 561 A.2d at 1130 (1989) (No. 28,324).
19 See Shaner 116 N.J. at 434, 561 A.2d at 1130.
20 Id. at 434-35, 561 A.2d at 1130.
21 Id. The third claim stemmed from the public policy of maintaining employment stability. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505
(1980). In Pierce, the plaintiff, a physician, alleged wrongful discharge for refusing
to perform research on a controversial drug she considered medically unethical. Id.
at 61-62, 417 A.2d at 506. The plaintiff refused to work on a project which required the research and development of a liquid drug containing saccharin. Id. at
62, 417 A.2d at 506-07. Because the drug contained the controversial ingredient,
the plaintiff felt the development of the drug violated her interpretation of the Hippocratic Oath. Id. at 63, 417 A.2d at 507. The New Jersey Supreme Court maintained that where the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy, a
cause of action will lie. Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512. However, the court noted that
the employee is required to clearly identify the specific public policy violated by the
employer in order to successfully assert an action for wrongful discharge. Id. at 7273,417 A.2d at 512-13. While the court indicated that the state's public policy may
be found in the Hippocratic Oath or other codes of professional responsibility, the
court determined that research on a "controversial" drug, as opposed to a banned
drug, would not violate the code of conduct nor state public policy. Id. at 76, 417
A.2d at 514.
The court also observed that this action could have been predicated on a

1990]

NOTE

939

terest, attorney fees, and punitive damages.22
Shaner filed a complaint and jury demand in New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division. 23 Horizon moved for partial summary judgment, seeking to limit Shaner's cause of action to his
claim under the LAD. 24 The trial court granted the motion for
partial summary judgment, dismissing the claim under the
ADEA 25 and the claim for wrongful discharge in violation of state
public policy,2 6 leaving only the LAD claim. 27 The trial court also
breach of an implied contractual obligation that an employer will not discharge an
employee for failure to perform an act which violates a clear mandate of public
policy. Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512. Cf. Vasquez v. Glassboro Servs. Ass'n, Inc., 83
NJ. 86, 415 A.2d 1156 (1980) (failure of an employment contract to provide a
migrant farm worker with reasonable opportunity to find shelter before dispossession is against public policy-implied into the contract is provision for reasonable
time to find alternative housing). The Pierce court also stressed that an action in
tort may be maintained under the facts presented in that case. Pierce, 84 N.J. at 76,
417 A.2d at 514.
22 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 435, 561 A.2d at 1130-31. In denying these allegations,
the defendant maintained that the plaintiff was an employee at-will and was fired
for just cause. Id.
23 See Brief for Respondent at 3, Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp, 116 N.J. 433, 561
A.2d 1130 (1989) (No. 28,324).
24 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 435, 561 A.2d at 1131.
25 Id. During oral argument, the plaintiff conceded that he could not seek relief
under the federal remedy because his claim did not fall within ADEA's two-year
statute of limitation period. See Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp, No. 28,324, slip. op. at
2 (App. Div. Jan. 12, 1988). The statute of limitations for an action brought under
the ADEA is addressed by 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(1) which states that the applicable
limitations period is found in the Portal to Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 255(a)
and 259. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626 (e)(1) (1982);
Portal to Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 255 and 259 (1982). Section § 255(a) states in
full:
Any action... may be commenced within two years after the cause of
action accrued, and every such action shall be forever barred unless
commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, except
that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued ....
See id. at § 255(a). See generally Michaels v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 628 F.
Supp. 48 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (plaintiff did not satisfy two-year ADEA statute of limitations because accrual date began to run upon notice of termination, not upon date
of actual termination). The federal act allows for reinstatement with back pay and
liquidated damages, but not for compensatory or punitive damages that may be
recovered with claims arising under the LAD. See 29 U.S.C. § 626 (b), (c) (1982)
and N.J. STAT. ANN § 10:5-3 (West Supp. 1989). Customarily, a plaintiff will assert
federal and state remedies concurrently, so as to fully recover. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 223 N.J. Super. 467, 538 A.2d 1310 (App. Div. 1988)
(held punitive damages could be awarded under the LAD).
26 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 435, 561 A.2d at 1131. The trial court judge ruled that
Shaner had no cause of action under Pierce. See Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp, No.
28,324, slip. op. at 2 (App. Div. Jan. 12, 1988). The wrongful discharge action is
recognized in New Jersey only upon proof of a specific mandate of public policy.
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granted Horizon's motion to strike Shaner's demand for a jury
trial. 28 Thereafter, the trial court conducted a non-jury trial, ruling that Shaner's discharge did not violate the LAD on the basis
of age discrimination.
Shaner appealed, challenging both the pre-trial order dismissing the demand for ajury trial and the trial court decision on
the merits. s0 The appellate division affirmed both rulings. 3 '
Shaner filed an appeal as of right to the New Jersey Supreme
Court.3

2

The supreme court upheld the appellate division's rul-

ing, rejecting Shaner's argument that he had a constitutional
right to jury trial in claims involving wrongful age discrimination
under the LAD.33
The seventh amendment of the United States Constitution,
adopted in 1791, preserves the right of trial by jury in civil suits
as it existed at common law.' 4 Upon cursory review, the entitlement to trial by jury in state civil actions may appear to have been
settled with the ratification of the fourteenth amendment of the
See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512. See supra
note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the Pierce case).
27 See Shaner, 116 N.J. at 435, 561 A.2d at 1131. In the process of granting Horizon's partial summary judgment, the superior court determined that a six-year statute of limitations was applicable to a judicial action under the LAD. See Shaner, slip.
op. at 2 (App. Div.Jan. 12, 1988). However, under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-18 (West
Supp. 1989), a complainant pursuing the administrative remedy, as opposed to the
judicial remedy, has 180 days to file his/her complaint with the Division on Civil
Rights. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-18 (West Supp. 1989). See, e.g., Nolan v. Otis
Elevator, 197 N.J. Super. 468, 485 A.2d 312 (App. Div. 1984) rev'd 102 N.J. 30, 505
A.2d 580, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820 (1986) (held six-year limitation period applied to
discrimination action rather than 180 day period applicable to administrative proceedings initiated with the Division on Civil Rights).
28 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 435, 561 A.2d at 1131.
29 Id.
30 Id.
3' Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The seventh amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried a by jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
Id. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1934) ( utilizing a seventh amendment
historical test to establish that the common law does not require a right to jury trial
when a plaintiff refuses to consent to additur and requests a new jury trial); Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, (1934) (utilizing a seventh amendment historical test to determine that a court may take a verdict subject to its
ultimate ruling on questions of law which it has reserved, without requiring a new
jury trial). See also James, supra note 8, at 655.
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federal Constitution. The Bill of Rights, however, has not been
totally incorporated through the fourteenth amendment so as to
provide for the application of the seventh amendment to the
states .36

37
In 1916, in Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Bombolis,
the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality
of a Minnesota statute prescribing the number of jurors necessary to constitute a verdict in a civil cause of action. 38 That statute specifically mandated that a decision of five-sixths of the jury
be deemed a "unanimous" decision when a jury fails to reach a
unanimous decision after twelve hours of deliberation.3" The
Court upheld the statute authorizing a jury to reach a less than
unanimous verdict in a civil cause of action.40
The Supreme Court reasoned that the ten amendments of
the Bill of Rights were not concerned with state action, but rather
only with federal action. 4 The Court emphasized that the sev35 See Wolfram, The ConstitutionalHistory of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN L. REV.
639, 646 n.21 (1973). Prior to the passage of the fourteenth amendment, the rights
and protections found in the Bill of Rights only applied as a limitation on the exercise of power by the federal government. Id. (citing Barron v. The Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833)). After the passage of the fourteenth
amendment in 1868, the Court held that the seventh amendment was not applicable to the states through the due process or privileges and immunities clauses of
the fourteenth amendment. See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1876).
36 See Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 253 n.2 (1982). Cf.
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended the amendment to totally
incorporate the Bill of Rights to render them applicable to the states). See U.S.
CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2, which provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Id.
37 241 U.S. 211 (1916).
38 Id. at 217.
39 Id. at 216.
40 Id. at 219-20. The defendant specifically challenged the Minnesota statute on
the grounds that the particular cause of action against him was federal in character,
and therefore the seventh amendment of the United States Constitution entitled
the defendant to have ajury reach its conclusion by a unanimous verdict. Id. at 216.
41 Id. at 217. See also Israel, supra note 36, at 253. Most of the first eight amendments have gradually become incorporated, but the seventh amendment remains
one of the exceptions. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1962).
There is another anomalous situation in which a Bill of Rights guarantee is interpreted to have a different scope in state proceedings than in federal proceedings.
See Israel, supra note 36, at 299. In interpreting the sixth amendment, the Court has
upheld the constitutionality of non-unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal cases,
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enth amendment applied only to proceedings in federal courts
and did not, in any manner, govern jury trials or the related standards applied to jury trials in state courts.4 2 Ultimately, the
Court implied that the seventh amendment's trial by jury guarantee was not protected by either the due process or privileges and
immunities clauses of the fourteenth amendment and thus, was
not applicable to state court proceedings.43
In 1957, in Fisch v. Manger,44 the New Jersey Supreme Court,
relying on the same precedents cited by the Bombolis Court,4 5 determined that the seventh amendment's guarantee of a jury trial
in civil causes of action was not applicable to the states.46 The
Fisch court looked to the state constitutional provision governing
the right to jury trial to determine whether a court could grant a
plaintiff's request for a new jury trial conditioned upon a defendant's refusal to consent to additur.47 In Fisch, the jury returned a
even though jury verdicts in federal criminal cases must be unanimous. Id. See, e.g.,
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
(1972) (companion cases upholding convictions of criminal defendants convicted
by 11-1 and 9-3 votes, respectively).
42 Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (citing
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876); Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 (1877)).
The Bombolis case involved the Federal Employers' Liability Act which contemplates
concurrent power in the federal and state courts. Id. at 218. The rights conferred
by the federal act are administered in accordance with the procedures prevailing in
each respective state court system. Id.
43 See id. at 211. See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). In Palko, the
Court stated that not all the Bill of Rights are incorporated through the fourteenth
amendment to apply to the states. Id. at 323. The Court explained that only those
rights deemed to be fundamental and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
should be "absorbed". Id. at 324-26. Justice Cardozo rejected the premise that the
fifth amendment's double jeopardy prohibition has been "absorbed" through the
fourteenth amendment and thus, held that the fifth amendment is not applicable to
the states. Id. at 328. Palko was later overruled. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969) (utilizing the selective incorporation doctrine, the Court held that the
prohibition against double jeopardy should be applicable to the states). The theory
of selective incorporation was set forth by Justice Brennan in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v.
Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960). See Israel, supra note 36, at 253. This doctrine still
prevails in contemporary Supreme Court opinions. See McDowell and Baer, The
Fourteenth Amendment: Should the Bill of Rights Apply to the States? The Disincorporation
Debate., 1987 UTAH L. REV. 951, 962 (1987).
44 24 N.J. 66, 130 A.2d 815 (1957).
45 Id. at 74-75, 130 A.2d at 820. Although the Fisch court never directly cited
Bombolis, both opinions relied on Walker v. Sauvinet, 90 U.S. 92 (1876) and Pearson
v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 (1877). See Bombolis, 241 U.S. at 217; Fisch, 24 N.J. at 75,
130 A.2d. at 820.
46 Fisch, 24 N.J. at 74-75, 130 A.2d at 820.
47 Id. at 75, 130 A.2d at 820. The term additur describes the power of a trial
court to increase inadequate damages awarded by a jury. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 36 (5th ed. 1979). The increase, with the defendant's consent, is a condition of
the denial of a plaintiff's motion for a new jury trial. Id. The term remittitur is
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verdict in the amount of $3,000.48 The plaintiff moved for a new

jury trial because he viewed the damages as inadequate. 49 The
trial court denied the plaintiff's motion because the defendant
consented to an increase in the amount of damages. 50 After the
court-prescribed increase, the plaintiff still viewed the damage
award as inadequate and appealed to the New Jersey Supreme
Court.5

The Fisch court asserted that the article of the New Jersey
Constitution governing the right to trial by jury did not prevent a
court from conditioning its grant of a new trial solely upon the
defendant's failure to consent to a court prescribed damage increase.5" The court noted that a trial court could also grant a
new trial conditioned upon plaintiff's failure to consent to a
court-prescribed decrease in an award."S The Fisch court reasoned that additur and remittitur were logically and realistically
indistinguishable. 54 The court stressed that it must first look to
the New Jersey Constitution as well as New Jersey case law to
ascertain whether the practices of remittitur and additur may be
employed in New Jersey without violating the right to jury trial.55
In reaching its holding, the court concluded that the seventh
amendment substantively differs from the New Jersey constituused to describe the inverse situation denying the defendant's application for a new
trial upon the condition that the plaintiff consents to a prescribed reduction in the
jury award. Id. Remittitur and additur have been viewed as useful tools in pursuing
substantial justice between litigants without the burdensome delay and expense associated with new trials. See Fisch at 71-72, 130 A.2d at 818. See generally Carlin,
Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L.Q 1 (1942) (thorough discussion on development of common law judicial verdict adjustments).
48 Fisch, 24 N.J. at 67, 130 A.2d at 816. The plaintiff suffered substantial injuries
as a result of an automobile accident. Id.
49 Id.

50 Id. The damage award was increased to $7,500. Id.
51 Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court certified the appeal on its own motion,
and reversed the trial court's denial of a new trial by jury. Id.
52 Id. at 80, 130 A.2d at 823. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Under a
seventh amendment analysis, the federal courts have adhered to the prohibition of
a new jury trial for the plaintiff when the defendant consents to an additur. Fisch,
24 N.J. at 72-73, 130 A.2d at 818-19. Conversely, the federal courts allow a new
jury trial for a defendant even if the plaintiff consents to a remittitur. Id. See Dimick
v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) (5-4 decision) (declined to upset an old common law
practice in upholding the prohibition of a new trial when a plaintiff consents to
additur). The Fisch court opined that it is doubtful the Supreme Court would still
subscribe to the inconsistency of the Dimick holding. See Fisch, 24 N.J. at 74, 130
A.2d at 820.
53 Fisch, 24 N.J. at 76-77, 130 A.2d at 820-21.
54 Id. at 72, 130 A.2d at 818.
55 Id. at 75, 130 A.2d at 820. The court posited that a constitutional right to trial
by jury relates to substance not procedure. Id.
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tional provisions dealing with a right to jury trial, and had no
56
application to state court proceedings.
Shortly after the adoption of the revised New Jersey Constitution in 1947, the case of Steiner v. Stein 57 presented the New
Jersey Supreme Court with an opportunity to examine the revised constitutional provision with respect to the right of trial by
jury.5 8 In Steiner, the plaintiff had previously hired the defendant
as his attorney for an agreed fee of $3,300 in order to finalize the
execution of a new lease involving one of the plaintiff's properties.5 9 After the plaintiff's tenant rejected the defendant's redrafted lease, the plaintiff again retained the services of the
defendant to renegotiate the new lease agreement. 60 The litigants disputed whether the additional services provided by the
defendant were included in the original $3,300 fee finalizing the
lease agreement. 6 '
The plaintiff sued to redeem his papers and to remove the
attorney's lien imposed by the defendant.6 2 The defendant
counterclaimed for the reasonable value of his services, and demanded ajury trial to determine his fee. 63 The chancery division
of the trial court transferred the action to the law division without
considering the defendant's demand for jury trial.' On its own
motion, the New Jersey Supreme Court certified for review the
chancery division's order of transfer in order to address the jurisdiction of the lower court as well as the defendant's right to ajury
56 Id. at 74-75, 130 A.2d at 820. (citing Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 (1877);
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876)).
57 2 N.J. 367, 66 A.2d 719 (1949).
58 Id. at 378, 66 A.2d at 724-25.
59 Id. at 369, 66 A.2d at 720. The parties already agreed to many of the terms in
the proposed new lease. Id. The defendant/attorney was brought into the transaction after the negotiations had transpired. Id.
6 Id.
61 Id. The plaintiffs proffered the originally agreed upon fee of $3,300, which
the defendant refused. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant demanded
$20,000 for the additional services rendered. Id. The defendant ultimately rendered a bill for $40,800. Id. at 370, 66 A.2d at 720.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 370-71, 66 A.2d at 720.
64 Id. at 371-72, 66 A.2d at 721. Citing to N.J. Ct. R. 3:40-3 to support the transfer of the action to the law division, the trial court determined that it properly disposed of all the equitable issues. Id. at 371, 66 A.2d at 721. The supreme court
emphasized that once the jurisdiction of equity attaches, the trial court may retain
jurisdiction to settle legal issues and grant legal remedies. Id. at 378, 66 A.2d at
724 (citing Fleischer v. James Drug Stores, Inc., 1 N.J. 138, 150, 62 A.2d 383, 389
(1948)).
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trial.65
The Steiner court held that it was appropriate to deny the
right to trial by jury in a dispute involving attorney fees.6 6 In
support of the lower court's application of equitable remedies,
the court noted that the nature of the attorney/client relationship
was fiduciary in nature rather than contractual. 67 The court subsequently denied the demand for jury trial. 68 The court determined that the right to jury trial would be preserved only if the
cause of action was triable by ajury under the NewJersey Constitution of 1844.69 The Steiner court concluded that the constitutional provision protecting trial by jury did not enlarge the scope
of the right, rather it only prevented the legislature and the
courts from truncating that right.7 0
Two years after the Steiner decision, the New Jersey Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether a right to jury trial existed
for newly-created statutory causes of action in Montclairv. Stanoyevich. 7 1 In Stanoyevich, the defendant appealed from a municipal
court conviction for a petty criminal offense involving a violation
of a zoning ordinance.7 2 On appeal, under the authority of New
Jersey Revised Statutes section 2:225-18"3 and section 2:33121,74 the defendant demanded a jury trial which the Essex
65 Id. at 369, 66 A.2d at 719. The order transferring the action from the chancery division to the law division was based on the lower court's interpretation of the
new state constitution and new court rules. Id. at 377, 66 A.2d at 724. The court
noted that the lower court should have retained jurisdiction even though only legal
issues remained. Id. at 378, 66 A.2d at 724.
66 Id. at 380, 66 A.2d at 725.
67 Id. at 372, 66 A.2d at 721.
68 Id. at 380, 66 A.2d at 725.
69 Id. at 379, 66 A.2d at 725.
70 Id.
71 6 N.J. 479, 79 A.2d 288 (1951).
72 Id. at 481, 79 A.2d at 289. The municipal court imposed a fine of $100 and
costs on the defendant. Id. The defendant was the owner of a newly constructed
garage which violated a zoning ordinance setting minimum frontage requirements
at not less than one-half the height of the building. Id. at 481-82, 79 A.2d at 289.
The defendant then failed to correct the mistake, whereupon complaints were filed
resulting in the conviction. Id. at 482, 79 A.2d at 289.
73 See N.J. REV. STAT. section 2:225-18 (1937). The defendant relied on section
2:225-18 (the statute pre-dates the 1947 Constitution), which provided that
"[e]very conviction for violating a town ordinance .. . with or without a jury trial,
may be reviewed by appeal to the court of common pleas of the county in the same
manner and upon same terms as appeals are or may be taken from the small cause
courts .... " See id.
74 See id. at § 2:33-121 (1937). The defendant also pointed to N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 2:33-121 (1937) which provided that appeals from the small cause courts enjoy a
right to demand a jury trial. Stanoyevich, 6 N.J. at 483, 79 A.2d at 290. Consequently, the appellant argued that these statutory provisions remained in force with
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County Court subsequently denied.7 5 The supreme court
granted certification on its own motion76 and determined that no
right to jury trial existed for newly-created statutory causes of action when the statute failed to explicitly provide for such a
right.77
In affirming the lower court's ruling, the New Jersey
Supreme Court rejected the appellant's argument that the 1947
constitution incorporated legislative provisions on the statute
books at the time of its adoption. 78 The court emphatically maintained that the right to jury trial referred to in each New Jersey
Constitution since 1776, was a right as it existed at common law
and remained as of July 2, 1776. 79 The court asserted that convictions before magistrates for petty criminal offenses were unknown at common law, and thus, were not protected within the
scope of the right to jury trial.8 0 The Stanoyevich opinion acknowledged that newly-created statutory offenses are not entitled
to the right to jury trial if the offense is not related to a class of
cases that are triable by jury at common law. 8 '
The New Jersey Supreme Court further explored the right to
the adoption of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947. Id. In fact, the court noted
that the legislature passed a statute abolishing the office of the Justice of the Peace
and small cause courts. Id. at 493, 79 A.2d at 295-96. The new statutes also provided that the rules promulgated by the New Jersey Supreme Court applicable to
municipal courts would supersede any statutory and common law regulations if
they conflict. Id.
75 Stanoyevich, 6 N.J. at 481, 79 A.2d at 289. The court concluded that the statute
relied upon by the appellant was impliedly repealed by the new statute. Id. at 494,
79 A.2d at 296. The court noted that although the law does not favor implied
repealers, it is a fundamental maxim that statutes must be interpreted according to
the apparent intentions of the legislature. Id. The court observed that when statutes are inconsistent or repugnant to a statute concerning the same subject matter,
and the more recent statute was "clearly intended to prescribe the only rule which
should govern the case provided for, it will be construed as repealing the earlier
act." Id. (citing State v. Cortese, 104 NJ.L. 312, 315, 140 A. 440, 442 (E. & A.
1927)).
76 Id. at 481, 79 A.2d at 289.
77 Id. at 485-87, 79 A.2d at 291-93.
78 Id. at 485, 79 A.2d at 291.
79 Id. The court interpreted the 1947 New Jersey Constitution article 1, paragraph 9 which provides that "the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." Stanoyevich, 6 N.J. at 485-86, 79 A.2d at 291. The court pointed to previous cases
construing the 1776 and 1844 constitutional provisions regarding trial by jury in a
similar fashion. Id. (citing State v. Doty, 32 N.J.L. 403 (E. & A. 1868); McGear v.
Woodruff, 33 NJ.L. 213 (E. & A. 1868)).
80 Stanoyevich, 6 N.J. at 490, 79 A.2d at 294. But cf. Note, The Petty Offense Exception and the Right toJury Trial, FORDHAM L. REV. 205 (1979) (stating the parameters
of the restriction on the right to jury trial under the Petty Offense Exception).
81 Stanoyevich, 6 N.J. at 487, 79 A.2d at 294 (citation omitted).
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trial by jury under the New Jersey Constitution in In re LiVolsi.82
In LiVolsi, the supreme court exercised original jurisdiction to review whether attorney fee arbitration committees deny an attorney's right to jury trial, as guaranteed by the New Jersey
Constitution."5 The New Jersey Constitution allows the New
Jersey Supreme Court to make rules governing court practice
and procedure.8 4 The Rules of Court promulgated by the New
Jersey Supreme Court created fee arbitration committees which
render binding and unappealable determinations of attorney/client fee disputes.85 Either the client or the attorney can request a
committee to arbitrate a fee dispute, but a lawyer's consent is not
required if the client requests arbitration. 6 When a client seeks
arbitration
an attorney is effectively denied the right to jury
7
trial.

8

85 N.J. 576, 428 A.2d 1268 (1981).
Id. at 582-83, 428 A.2d at 1272. The petitioner brought an action against the
New Jersey Supreme Court in federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of Rule 1:20A. Id. at 582, 428 A.2d at 1271. While the action was pending, the
New Jersey Supreme Court invited the petitioner to bring the challenge of Rule
1:20A to its forum. Id.
84 See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § II, para. 3. The provision states in full: "The
Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the
State and, subject to law, the practice and procedure in all such courts. The
Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and
the discipline of persons admitted." Id. The court emphasized that this provision
of the New Jersey Constitution also provides an independent basis for exercising
original jurisdiction. See LiVolsi, 85 N.J. at 583-84, 428 A.2d at 1271-72.
85 LiVolsi, 85 N.J. at 581, 428 A.2d at 1270.
86 Id. at 581, 428 A.2d at 1270. Conversely, a client must consent to an attorney's request for a committee determination. Id.
87 Id. at 590-91, 428 A.2d at 1275. Aside from the jury trial argument, the plaintiff also asserted three other arguments under (1) equal protection, (2) due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, (3) and the
prerogative writ provision of the New Jersey Constitution. Id. at 582, 428 A.2d at
1270. In rejecting petitioner's equal protection argument, the court noted that attorneys are not a suspect class and no fundamental right was being infringed upon,
and that the procedurally and economically efficient remedy to correct unreasonable fees established the rational basis to support the disparate treatment. Id. at
586-87, 428 A.2d at 1273. The petitioner also lost arguments challenging the constitutionality of the rule on the ground that the unappealability of committee determinations is violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution and the prerogative writ provision of the New Jersey
Constitution article VI, section V, paragraph 4. Id. at 591-93, 428 A.2d at 1275-76.
The court refuted the due process argument by citing an example of how determinations are appealable if the committee violates a party's constitutional rights
through discrimination on account of race. Id. at 591, 428 A.2d at 1275-76 n.15.
See, e.g., Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974)
(challenge initiated in federal district court claiming racial discrimination in selections to the board of education nominating panel).
In denying the constitutionality argument under the New Jersey Constitution,
82
83
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Utilizing the same type of historical analysis employed in
Steiner,8 the LiVolsi court stated that an attorney has no entitlement to a jury trial once a fee arbitration committee has jurisdiction. 9 The court asserted that the petitioner would have had to
establish that attorneys were entitled to jury trials in cases involving client fee disputes before the adoption of the 1947 constitution. 90 The court noted that pre-1947 case law strongly
supported the denial ofjury trials in such actions, because attorney-client fee disputes had traditionally fallen within the broad
power of the New Jersey equity courts. 91 The court concluded
that New Jersey attorneys never had an absolute right to a jury
trial in fee dispute cases, and that a right to jury trial in fee arbitration would render inoperative the New Jersey Supreme
Court's constitutional authority in regulating the New Jersey
Bar.92
The 1978 decision of Peper v. Princeton University Board of
Trustees93 is significant in LAD litigation, insofar as it admonishes
that, while legislation can vindicate the New Jersey Constitution,
the court asserted that prerogative writs were never used to review decisions of
judicially created agencies. LiVoli, 85 NJ. at 593, 428 A.2d at 1276. The court
acknowledged, however, that prerogative writs were intended to guarantee appeals
as of right from legislatively created administrative agencies. Id. at 596-97, 428
A.2d at 1278. The court also refuted the prerogative writ argument by explaining
the importance of the New Jersey Supreme Court's obligation pursuant to the New
Jersey Constitution article VI, section II, paragraph 3, to regulate the bar. Id. at
596-97, 428 A.2d at 1278-79.
88 LiVolsi, 85 NJ. at 587, 428 A.2d at 1273. See supra notes 57-81.
89 LiVolsi, 85 N.J. at 590, 428 A.2d at 1275.
90 Id. at 587, 428 A.2d at 1273.
91 Id. at 588, 428 A.2d at 1274 (citing Lewis v. Morgan, 132 NJ. Eq. 343 (Ch.
Div. 1942)) (court granted an application to restrain an action at law, when the
defendant attempted to transfer their attorney-client fee dispute into a court of
law). NewJersey eliminated its equity courts with the adoption of the 1947 Constitution, which provided for a law division and a chancery division within the superior court. Although separate courts of law and courts of equity have ceased to
exist in the federal judiciary and in most state court systems, the distinction is still
viable when ascertaining whether a right to a jury trial exists. See CASAD & SIMON,
CIVIL PROCEDURE 561-69 (1984). See also N.J. CONST. art. III, para. 4, which specifically provides:
Subject to the rules of the Supreme Court, the Law Division and the
Chancery Division shall each exercise the powers and functions of the
other division when the ends ofjustice so require, and legal and equitable relief shall be granted in any cause so that all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely determined.
Id.
92 LiVolsi, 85 N.J. at 590-91, 428 A.2d 1275.
93 77 N.J. 55, 389 A.2d 465 (1978).
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it cannot somehow replace the constitution. 94 In Peper, the plaintiff alleged sex discrimination against defendant, Princeton University, which prevented her from being promoted. 95 The Peper
court determined that, at the time of this action, the LAD did not
apply to private universities.96 More importantly, the Peper court
indicated that a discrimination action was not akin to a common
97
law cause of action, but one of state constitutional origin.
A decade later in Fuchilla v. Layman, 98 the New Jersey
Supreme Court addressed the potential of viewing the LAD as a
tort action.99 In Fuchilla, the plaintiff alleged discrimination due
to sexual harassment. 10 0 The plaintiff attempted to assert her
claims under the authority of the New Jersey Torts Claims Act
(Act) and the LAD.'
The court posited that the lack of an express relationship in the legislative histories of both statutes was
not indicative of the existence of an actual relationship between
the Act and the LAD. 10 2 Although "discrimination" is presuma94 See id. See also King v. South Jersey Nat. Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 330 A.2d 1 (1974).
ChiefJustice Hughes, in King, posited: "Just as the Legislature cannot abridge constitutional rights by its enactments, it cannot curtail them through its silence, and
the judicial obligation to protect the fundamental rights of individuals is as old as
this country." Id. at 177, 330 A.2d at 10.
95 Peper, 77 N.J. at 61, 389 A.2d at 468.
96 Id. at 71, 389 A.2d at 473. The plaintiff could not bring the action under the
LAD due to the applicability of the LAD's definitional section, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-5, which excluded a "private university" from the accepted interpretation of
the term "employer". Id. at 66-67, 389 A.2d at 471. The definitional section was
amended to include "private university" within the scope of the definition of the
term "employer", but the pre-amendment interpretation of the term "employer"
was applicable to this suit because the cause of action accrued before the amendment was passed. Id.
97 Id. at 79-80, 389 A.2d at 477-78. The plaintiff argued successfully that the
right to obtain gainful employment and to utilize the benefits from such labor to
acquire property are fundamental rights with a constitutional basis. Id. at 77-78,
389 A.2d at 477-78. See N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1, which states: "All persons are by
nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and property, of acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." Id.
98 109 NJ. 319, 537 A.2d 652 (1988).
99 Id. Cf. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980)
(wrongful discharge based on violation of public policy). See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
100 Fuchilla, 109 N.J. at 321, 537 A.2d at 653. The plaintiff was employed at the
University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey as a secretary, and she alleged
sexual harassment, which resulted in her discharge. Id.
101 Id. at 320, 537 A.2d at 652-53. The plaintiff also successfully asserted a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 321, 537 A.2d at 653.
102 Id. at 333, 537 A.2d at 658. (citing Healey v. Township of Dover, 208 NJ.
Super. 679, 506 A.2d 824 (West 1986) (claims of sexual discrimination and harass-
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bly included within the interpretation of the term "injury" as defined by the Act, the court clarified that the LAD did not
explicitly provide that a discrimination action be treated as a
tort. 1O

It is against this background that the New Jersey Supreme
Court decided Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp, which addressed the
right to jury trial under the LAD. 1° In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Handler, the supreme court held that a litigant
does not enjoy a right to a jury trial under the LAD on claims for
wrongftil discrimination based on age. 10 5 The court emphasized
that the LAD should be construed as a newly-created statutory
cause of action which did not enjoy the guarantee of an inviolate
right to jury trial under the New Jersey Constitution. 10 6 Moreover, the court rejected the premise that the LAD was analogous
to any type of common law cause of action which enjoyed the
constitutional guarantee of the right to jury trial. 0 7
Justice Handler began his analysis by looking to the language contained in the LAD to determine whether the statute expressly or impliedly conferred the right to jury trial.'
The court
recognized that the statute sets forth the goal of eliminating individual discrimination. 10 9 In addition, the court posited that disment "fall within the expansive Tort Claims Act definition of 'injury' that includes
'injury to a person' or 'damage to or loss of property' ").
103 Id.
104 116 N.J. 433, 561 A.2d 1130 (1989).
105 Id. at 457, 561 A.2d at 1140.
106 Id. at 456-57, 561 A.2d at 1140. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
107 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 455, 561 A.2d at 1141.
108 Id. at 435-36, 561 A.2d at 1131. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West Supp.
1989). The court pointed out that the plaintiff relied on this provision, as the one
specifying the substantive right that is the basis of his cause of action. Id. at 436,
561 A.2d at 1131. Section 10:5-12 of the New Jersey Statutes expands New Jersey
Constitution article I, paragraph 5. Section 10:5-12 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice, or, as the case may
be, an unlawful discrimination:
a. For an employer, because of the race, creed, color, national
origin, ancestry, age, marital status, sex.., to refuse to hire or employ
or to bar or to discharge or require to retire, unless justified by lawful
considerations other than age, from employment such individual or to
discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West Supp. 1989).
109 Shaner, 116 NJ. at 436, 561 A.2d at 1131. The court has previously declared
that the opportunity to obtain employment is a civil right. Id. The court has also
emphasized a state mandate of public policy reflected in the LAD, that attempts to
abolish discrimination in the work place. Id. (citing Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J.
319, 324, 537 A.2d 653, 658 (1988)).

1990]

NOTE

951

crimination must be prevented from threatening the "institutions
and foundations of a free democratic state." 10
The Shaner court noted that there are distinctive procedural
and substantive standards in the LAD which serve to clearly define discrimination actions. " 'I The Shaner court recognized that a
distinctive feature of the LAD is the wide ranging remedial power
that may be exercised by the Director of the Division on Civil
Rights." 2 Discussing the director's administrative power, the
court explained how the director could grant redress to the individual while discouraging future conduct that was inconsistent
with the broad societal imperative of eradicating discrimination.' ' The court pointed to the procedural choice a prospective
plaintiff has in either filing the administrative complaint with the
director or initiating a civil action in
the superior court to illus4
trate the LAD's unique character.' "
11O Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West Supp. 1989)). See supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
I11 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 436, 561 A.2d at 1131. The court acknowledged that the
substantive standards are significantly influenced by the lessons taught from litigation under federal anti-discrimination laws. Id. at 437, 561 A.2d at 1131. See Peper
v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 81 (1978) (adopting procedures
formulated in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green 411 U.S. 792 (1973), for litigation under Title VII). The court also recognized that LAD's procedural nuances
are designed to locate where discrimination exists and facilitate the initiation of
grievances based on that discrimination. Shaner, 116 N.J. at 437, 561 A.2d at 1132.
See Fuchilla, 109 N.J. at 345, 537 A.2d at 665 (Handler, J., concurring).
112 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 438, 561 A.2d at 1132. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-17 (West
Supp. 1989). The provision states in part:
If, upon all evidence at the hearing, the director [of the Division
of Civil Rights] shall find that the respondent has engaged in any unlawful employment practice or unlawful discrimination as defined in
this act, the director shall state his findings of fact and conclusions of
law and shall issue and cause to be served on such respondent to
cease and desist from such unlawful employment practice or unlawful
discrimination and to take such affirmative action, including, but not
limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or
without back pay . ..or extending full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, and privileges to all persons, as in thejudgment
of the director, will effectuate the purpose of this act ....
Id.
113 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 438, 561 A.2d at 1132. (citing Passaic Daily News v. Blair,
63 N.J. 474, 308 A.2d 649 (1973) (director allowed to set standards for newspaper
advertising in an effort to preclude the ads from being segregated on the basis of
sex)).
114 Id. at 440, 561 A.2d at 1133. The court noted that the LAD allows the director to grant traditional relief for compensatory damages. Id. at 439, 561 A.2d 1133.
See, e.g., Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113, 253 A.2d 793 (1969) (awarded rental
and travel expenses as the compensatory damages against landlord for the discriminatory act of failing to lease premise to a prospective black tenant). The court observed that incidental damages for pain and suffering or personal humiliation are

952

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 20:935

The Shaner court observed that the New Jersey Legislature
amended the LAD in 1979 to add the judicial action not as a replacement for, but as an alternative to the administrative action." 5 The court posited that since the judicial and
administrative authority with respect to the LAD's goals are very
similar in purpose, the differing procedures should yield consistent results. 1 6 The court interpreted the legislative history of
the amendment to reveal that the underlying purpose of the judicial action provision was the reduction of costs and backlog of
cases to the Division on Civil Rights. 1 7 The court maintained
that the legislative intent could not be reconciled with the utilization of a right to jury trial in an LAD-based court action.' 18
Justice Handler reiterated that the express language in the
amendment indicates that the legislature did not intend to confer
within the director's broad remedial power. Id. See also Zahorian v. Russell Fitt
Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973) (awarded compensatory
damages for the pain and suffering to an unmarried female tenant, due to the fact
she was denied the opportunity of renting a listed apartment solely because of her
sex and marital status).
115 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 440, 561 A.2d at 1133. The court posited that the remedies are complementary. Id. Although a claimant may pursue only one remedy at a
time, he or she may seek alternative or successive vindication. See, e.g., Hermann v.
Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 183 N.J. Super. 500, 444 A.2d 614 (App. Div.), certif
denied, 91 N.J. 573 (1982). The court further noted that the choice to bring judicial
action, as an alternative to administrative relief, was expressly authorized by a 1979
amendment to the LAD. Shaner, 116 N.J. at 440, 561 A.2d at 1133.
116 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 441, 561 A.2d at 1134. The court emphasized that the two
actions need not be identical. Id. In fact, judicial actions may afford more monetary
damages than might be otherwise obtained in an administrative proceeding. Id.
The court noted Justice Handler's concurring opinion in Fuchilla which stated:
"[A]ny interpretation of the [LAD) that makes the initiation of discrimination suits
in Superior Court less attractive than administrative proceedings before the Division on Civil Rights must be viewed as a disincentive, frustrating the intended effect
of the 1979 amendment [explicitly granting ajudicial remedy]." Id. at 440-41, 561
A.2d at 1135 (quoting Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J 319, 346, 537 A.2d 652, 665-66
(1988) (Handler, J., concurring)). See also Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J.
Super. 297, 265 A.2d 404 (Ch. Div. 1970) (prior to 1979 amendment, complainant
could file a damages action under the LAD in superior court only until after such
time as the person chooses to exhaust the administrative remedy).
117 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 442-43, 561 A.2d. at 1135. The court noted that the underlying purpose should be achieved "so that society's war on discrimination would
not slacken." Id.
118 Id. at 443, 561 A.2d at 1135. The court observed that the legislative history
suggests that the right to bring a suit in superior court was intended to allow a
cause of action that would be fully consistent with administrative actions under the
LAD. Id. at 442, 561 A.2d at 1134-35. The court also cited the delays and inherent
limitations which would defeat the legislative goals of reducing agency backlog and
providing a judicial alternative comparable to the administrative action. Id. at 44243, 561 A.2d 1135.
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the right to jury trial in LAD actions. 1 9 Furthermore, the court
cited many examples of newly-created statutory causes of action
to illustrate how the legislature has consistently conferred the
right to jury trial only through express provisions. 20 The court
noted that employment discrimination actions under Title VII
have traditionally been characterized by the United States
Supreme Court as primarily equitable in nature, and thus, these
actions are undeserving of a right to jury trial.' 2 ' Moreover, the
court compared the LAD cause of action with employment discrimination actions under Title VII to support the proposition
that the right to jury trial does not accompany an action under
the LAD. 1 22 The court reinforced its analysis by analogizing the
remedial powers utilized by the Director of the Division on Civil
Rights to the remedies provided under Title VII.' 2 ' The court
determined that the New Jersey Legislature did not expressly or
impliedly create a traditional action at law, nor did it intend to
confer the right to jury trial in equitable actions when it amended
1 24
the LAD to allow the judicial remedy.
The Shaner court then addressed whether the right to jury
trial under the LAD was conferred by the New Jersey Constitution.' 2 5 The court opined that as of the adoption of the New
119 Id.

120 Id. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
121 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 443, 561 A.2d at 1135. See Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375 (1979); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197
(1974).
122 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 443-45, 561 A.2d at 1136-37. The Supreme Court determined that legal or monetary awards are incidental in Title VII actions. Id. The
Supreme Court stated that, because Title VII claims summon the equity powers of
the courts, they do not require a right to jury trial. Id. at 444, 561 A.2d at 1136.
123 Id. at 445-46, 561 A.2d at 1136. The court noted that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
describes the powers a federal court may utilize when it finds unlawful employment
practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1984), which, in pertinent part, provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or
is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate which may include,
but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or
labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful
employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate.
Id.
124 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 446, 561 A.2d at 1136-37. The court noted a case in Camden County Superior Court cited by the plaintiff, in which an LAD claim was tried
before a jury. Id. at 446 n.3, 561 A.2d at 1137 n.3. The court pointed out that the
plaintiff failed to demonstrate whether the LAD claim, in that case, was independent of other claims which entitled the party to a right to jury trial. Id.
125 Id. at 446, 561 A.2d at 1137. The plaintiff contended that since the right to
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Jersey Constitution of 1776, the provisions governing the right to
jury trial in the three respective New Jersey Constitutions have
only protected that right where the right existed at common
law. ' 26 The Shaner court employed an historical analysis, as previously used in Steiner, Stanoyevich, and LiVolsi, to examine
whether the cause of action enjoyed the right to jury trial at common law. 127 The court noted that lower courts have continuously
followed this historical test in denying a2 8right to jury trial for
newly-created statutory causes of action.1
After briefly discussing other states' positions on the right to
jury trial under anti-discrimination statutes, 29 the court distinguished its analysis from that of the federal courts.'13 The Shaner
court explained that federal courts focus primarily, if not entirely,
on the remedy, as opposed to the cause of action, in assessing the
right to jury trial. 13 1 However, the Shaner court stressed that its
approach was discernible in that it examined the nature of the
underlying controversy, as opposed to looking strictly at the remedy required. 13 2 Thus, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that he had an entitlement to a jury trial because he was
3
seeking solely legal relief.' 3
jury trial, as noted in the New Jersey Constitution, shall remain inviolate, then the
right cannot be restricted by legislative actions. Id. at 446-47, 561 A.2d at 1137.
126 Id. at 447, 561 A.2d at 1137.
127 Id. at 447-51, 561 A.2d at 1137-39. See In re LiVolsi, 85 N.J. 576, 428 A.2d
1268 (1981); Steiner v. Stein, 2 N.J. 367, 66 A.2d 719 (1949). See also supra notes
57-94 and accompanying text.
128 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 448, 561 A.2d at 1137-38. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
129 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 449, 561 A.2d at 1138. The other state courts also utilize
an historical analysis to determine whether the right to jury trial is conferred in
their anti-discrimination statutes. Id. However, these courts are divided on
whether their anti-discrimination statutes "have codified pre-existing common law
causes of action" that historically bestowed a right to jury trial or have created
entirely new substantive rights for the purpose of determining whether the litigants
enjoy the right to jury trial. Id. See, e.g., Murphy v. Cartex Corp., 337 Pa. Super.
181, 546 A.2d 1217 (1988) (denying right to jury trial because discrimination
causes of action were foreign and unknown to the common law). Cf. Schafke v.
Chrysler Corp., 147 Mich. App. 751, 383 N.W.2d. 141 (1985) (granting a right to
jury trial because discrimination causes of action were previously recognized by the
common law).
130 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 449-50, 561 A.2d at 1138.
131 Id. at 449, 561 A.2d at 1138 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974))
(the Court noted that the actual and punitive damages sought in that case are akin
to the damages offered in courts of law).
132 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 450-51, 561 A.2d at 1139.
133 Id. at 451, 561 A.2d at 1139. The court also refuted this by stressing that the
plaintiff included attorney fees which is a distinctively statutory and equitable form of
relief. Id. (emphasis added). (citing Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v.
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The court also refuted the argument that employment discrimination on the basis of age should be perceived as a tort or
contract claim observed at common law.' 34 The court acknowledged that employment discrimination actions may involve tort
or contract principles that utilize conventional legal remedies,
and may even contain elements similar to those of an LAD-based
claim.' 3 5 The court stressed however, that the LAD cause of action had neither codified nor incorporated those common law
causes of action. 136 Thus, the court maintained that the LAD furnished a distinctive and unique statutory cause of action that was
not to be equated with any other type of common law tort or
1 37
contract cause of action.
Finally, the court addressed whether the LAD cause of action
could be recognized as a constitutional cause of action conferring
the right to ajury trial.' 3 " While noting that the NewJersey Constitution of 1947 prohibited discrimination "because of religious
principles, race, color, ancestry or national origin,"'' 39 the court
articulated that the LAD gave practical effect to this provision,
and further added gender and age as classifications requiring
protection in the area of unlawful employment practice. 140 The
court stated that the LAD did not displace the constitution, but
implemented the constitution itself.' 4 ' The court restated that
the LAD was not analogous to common law actions involving jury
trials. 142 Moreover, the court posited that the LAD sought to efMayor and Council of Cranbury, 115 N.J 536, 559 A.2d 1369; Singer v. State, 95
N.J. 487, 472 A.2d 138 (1984)).
134 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 451-53, 561 A.2d at 1139-40.
135 Id. at 452-53, 561 A.2d at 1140. (citing Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
223 N.J. Super. 467, 538 A.2d 1310 (1988)).
136 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 453, 561 A.2d at 1140. (citing Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 227 N.J. Super 78, 545 A.2d 812 (1988)).
137 Id. The court explained that the LAD is specifically aimed at the achievement
of the LAD's goals. Id. Thus, the court rejected the argument that "the action
involves rights and remedies of the sort enforced at law" and "there is no justification for denying the jury trial right." Id. at 453, 561 A.2d at 1140 (citation
omitted).
138 Id. at 455, 561 A.2d at 1141.
139 Id. See N.J. CoNsT. art. I, para. 5. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
140 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 455-56, 561 A.2d at 1141. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12
(West Supp. 1989). See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
141 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 456, 561 A.2d at 1140. See Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of
Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 389 A.2d 465 (1978). The court emphasized that Peper did not
suggest that a constitutional cause of action was a functional equivalent to a common law cause of action, nor did Peper indicate that the constitutional cause of action confers a right to jury trial. Shaner, 116 N.J. at 456, 561 A.2d at 1146. See also
supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
142 Shaner, 116 N.J. at 457, 561 A.2d at 1142.
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fectuate social goals and individual interests which were basically
equitable in nature.1 43 Before concluding that the LAD did not
entail the right to jury trial,144 justice Handler acknowledged that
the opinion neglected to address the issue as to whether age45 discrimination directly violated the New Jersey Constitution.
While the Shaner decision may appear to have settled the
question surrounding a right to jury trial in new causes of action
having no common law basis, the underlying issue of the potential presence of a constitutional violation for age discrimination
has yet to be addressed. By acknowledging the court's hesitancy
to address the issue of whether age discrimination directly violates the New Jersey Constitution, Justice Handler implied that
the court is cognizant of the sensitive waters upon which the judiciary is treading. Indeed, if the Shaner court had not exercised its
judicial discretion, and instead ruled upon the issue, it is likely
that its action would be viewed as an egregious encroachment of
the powers of the New Jersey Legislature. By acknowledging the
issue, but opting not to address it, the court may be attempting
to put the legislature on notice that legislative action needs to be
taken on the question of whether age discrimination directly violates the New Jersey Constitution. It remains a distinct
probability that this question will become ripe for examination in
the very near future. Until that time, the court appears to be unwilling to overstep its bounds.
This case provided an opportunity to test the uncertainty
surrounding the right to jury trial in state court exclusively under
the LAD. Because the majority of plaintiffs file their claims
jointly under both federal and state law, the procedural aberration which occurred in this case may render the holding in Shaner
to be limited in effect. 14 6 In cases where the statute of limitations
has run on federal ADEA claims, federal courts in the Third CirId.
Id.
145 Id. at 456, 561 A.2d at 1142. Although plaintiff never asserted the argument,
the court hinted that an equal protection violation under the New Jersey Constitution may occur when an older person is deprived of a right to acquire property
because of age discrimination. Id.
146 In response to Shaner, the NewJersey Legislature passed a bill which provides
for jury trials for all actions arising under the LAD. 125 N.J.LJ. 868 (April 5,
1990). Governor Florio signed the bill into law on April 16, 1990. 1990 N.J. Laws
Ch. 12 (April 16, 1990). The legislation entitles whistleblowers and persons alleging racial, sexual, and age discrimination to jury trials. Id. The legislation specifically applies to cases brought under the LAD and the Conscientious Employee
Protection Act (Whistleblowers Law). Id. With this new legislation, NewJersey has
become one of the few states to offer jury trials under state anti-discrimination laws.
143
144
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cuit have granted jury trials under the LAD. 147 New Jersey has
since passed a law which grants a plaintiff the right to a jury trial
for claims arising under the LAD.' 48 Notwithstanding the fact
that this new law usurps the Shaner holding, Shaner remains significant as an illustration of the New Jersey Supreme Court's adherence to a rigid historical test.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decisions in Steiner v.
Stein, ' 49 Stanoyevich v. Montclair,'5 0 and In re LiVolsi, 151 clearly illus-

trate the court's position that no present right to jury trial exists
52

unless it existed prior to the passage of the state constitution.

These decisions are significant because they demonstrate the
supreme court's consistent adherence to historical inquiry in ascertaining whether an entitlement to a jury trial for a particular
cause of action existed at common law.' 53 Only those rights that
154
existed prior to the adoption of the constitution will endure.
In order to comprehend the intricacies of the right to jury
trial issue one must understand the common law structure of the
American legal system which derived law from both courts of equity and courts of law. In most United States court systems, the
distinction between law and equity was eliminated through the
merger of the two jurisdictions into one court. 155 However, the
distinction between law and equity remains important for the task
of ascertaining whether a right to jury trial should exist. Historically, cases cognizable by courts of law were triable by a jury
while equity provided no right to a jury trial.' 5 6 When the two
147 See McMillan v. Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 678 F. Supp. 89 (D.N.J.
1988). Upon removal to the federal court, Judge Bissell allowed the right to jury
trial based on application of the seventh amendment and his reading of Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) which states the LAD "creates legal rights and remedies" for a LAD claim. 678 F. Supp. at 91.
148 See 1990 N.J. Laws Ch. 12 (April 16, 1990).
149 2 NJ. 367, 66 A.2d 719 (1949).
150 6 N.J. 479, 79 A.2d 288 (1951).
151 85 N.J. 576, 428 A.2d 1268 (1981).
152 The court used the type of historical analysis employed in Steiner, which referred to the 1844 Constitution. Stanoyevich pointed to the 1776 Constitution, while
LiVolsi relies on the 1947 document. The court in Shaner does not resolve the differences between pertaining provisions in the three similar constitutions. See Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp, 116 N.J. 433, 561 A.2d 1130 (1989).
153 See supra notes 44-92 and accompanying text.
154 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
155 In NewJersey the distinction was eliminated under the 1947 Constitution so
that the law and chancery divisions each exercise the power and functions of the
other when the ends of justice so require. See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § III, para. 4.
156 See Steiner v. Stein, 2 N.J. 367, 376, 66 A.2d 719, 725 (1949).
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jurisdictions merged, the right was determined by the application
of an historical test.
The Shaner court's use of an historical test to address the
right to a jury trial in new causes of action arising under the purview of the New Jersey Constitution marks yet another New
Jersey milestone in a well-developed area of the law. Many have
argued that the historical test is an outdated tool that does not
properly mesh with contemporary legal analysis because it fails to
account for the merger of law and equity jurisdictions in United
States' court systems. Indeed, the federal courts' progressive response to the merger changed from focusing its analysis on the
form of an action, to focusing on the substance of the rights and
remedies. 57 Many state judicial systems on the other hand were
not as progressive, and as a result numerous state courts, including New Jersey, still focus on the form of the action.15 8 Some
doubt remains as to whether the merger of law and equity jurisdictions should have any effect on the outcome of an historical
test. If it does have relevance, then the historical test may operate ineffectively in modern legal analysis. The chronology of
cases reviewing the right to jury trial evidences the court's
steadfast reliance on the historical test, which operates to restrict
the right to jury trial in new causes of action where the Legislature has not explicitly provided for the right. The New Jersey
Supreme Court has consistently applied a more liberal interpretation of the law than the federal judiciary when interpreting fundamental, constitutional rights. The New Jersey Supreme
Court's rigidness in this instance appears
to be an oxymoron
59
when reconciled with its past record.
Darin D. Pinto
157 See Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp, 116 N.J. 433, 449-50, 561 A.2d 1130, 1138-39
(1989).

158 Id.
159 See A.
(1988).
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